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THE RE-MAKING OF EUROPE – THE LONG VIEW 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Writing early in the present century, Habermas wondered what impetus there still was to political 
innovations in Europe, given their ‘rather wealthy and peaceful societies’ (2001: 8).  Without some 
crisis, steps towards building stronger and more democratic institutions for the EU risked stalling.  He 
need not have worried.  The financial crisis of 2008, the imposition of austerity on the economies of 
the periphery, and the influx of refugees and economic migrants from the south-east have provided 
more than enough of a challenge.  Nevertheless, positive steps to address these crises have as yet 
been fragmented and ineffective – and in some ways have only made matters worse.      
I begin with three widely voiced judgments on the European Union:   
 It was war and conflict, that had twice torn Europe apart, that provided the impetus to EU 
integration in the post-war decades (1950s-80s). This was an immensely impressive and 
historic achievement.  The expansion to the east, following the end of the Cold War, continued 
that process (Milward, 1984, Anderson, 2009).  
 If integration is to mean more than the reconciliation of nation states and political elites, it 
requires a stronger democratic engagement for the peoples of Europe.  During the 1990s-
2000s, this was repeatedly tried but failed.   The root of this failure was the lack of a European 
‘demos’ – the essential basis for shared democratic institutions (Scharpf, 2014). 
 European integration since the financial crisis of 2008 has produced a sense in local 
communities that they are losing control over their lives, with growing instability and 
insecurity.  This has been a cause for dismay and alarm, with growing Euroscepticism and the 
danger of EU disintegration.    
I re-examine these three judgments and the interconnected processes to which they refer.   
 
2. THE MAKING OF EUROPE    
Those who promoted European integration following WW2 hoped to move from the hurt and pain 
inflicted on each other, by generations of Europeans, to a new trajectory of reconciliation, solidarity 
and peace: a European demos transcending the divisions that had set national communities at each 
other’s throats.  When they sought inspiration in Europe’s history, they looked back beyond the 
fissiparous nationalisms of recent centuries, the Ancient Regime of the 18th century and the religious 
wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, to Charlemagne and the making of Europe in the High Middle 
Ages (Macgregor, 2016: Ch 11).   
For us also, that distance can help place our questions in a larger historical context – even if this then 
raises as many new questions as it solves.  I start with Bartlett’s study of The Making of Europe: 
Conquest, Colonisation and Cultural Change 950-1350 (1993).  Bartlett describes a shared European 
culture and a shared sense of identity – in some sense a European demos. This was Latin Christendom 
– inspired by the Church of Rome and its expansionist crusades from the 11th century onwards, in 
alliance with the aristocracies of Charlemagne’s erstwhile domain.  They spread to the pagan north 
and east and to the Islamic south, hungry for land and feudal dues.  This expansion - and the wealth 
that it brought – then paved the way for the strong nation states of north-western Europe and the 
consolidation of their own national demoi.        
Nevertheless, it was military technology, aristocratic greed and religious zeal that drove the new 
order.  Local traditions were brushed aside and local people barely noticed.  Cereal production, land 
enclosures and the feudal system displaced and subordinated the peasantry of the periphery.  If there 
was a European demos, it was shaped by the raw power of the European north-west, no less than in 
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modern times.  Then as now, the cultural convergence of the European demos was energised by the 
inducements of agriculture, transnational markets and military firepower. Then as now, scholarly 
exchange provided a veneer of civility.        
This may have looked to contemporaries like the ‘end of history’. Even here, however, new seeds and 
possibilities for disruptive change were also emerging.   
First, the new urban settlements in the territories of the periphery typically involved charters from the 
aristocratic ruler.  These offered freedoms and rights to the wealth extracted from the local area, in 
order to attract immigration from the north-west European core. Behind their protective walls, they 
enabled local creativity and interdependence to flourish and constituted themselves as new forms of 
community, limiting the jurisdiction of local rulers.     
Second, the early shoots of what would later be celebrated as the ‘spirit of capitalism’ were already 
evident: new forms of book-keeping and accounting; the social construction and regulation of new 
markets, by those involved in trading networks;  the endless struggle for positional dominance, born 
of confidence in God. Here were the seeds of an eventually very different economic order: not just 
the capitalism to which Marx, Weber and Tawney would give their attention, but the corporate 
behemoths that today bestride the European Union.    
Finally, while the conquerors from the north-west were victorious, in both economic and military 
terms, this was not without resistance. Local rulers sometimes survived by making complex alliances 
with immigrant aristocrats, in attempts to ‘ride the tide of change’.  The English in Ireland became 
Gaelicised. The pagan Lithuanian state was born in response to the German threat and eventually 
dominated eastern Europe.     
It is therefore somewhat ironic that following WW2, the authors of European integration looked back 
to Charlemagne and the making of Europe in the High Middle Ages, as an inspiration – or perhaps a 
lazy nostalgia - for their own efforts to turn swords into ploughshares.  That earlier making of the 
European people was achieved through violent conquest - and a readiness to disrupt and disregard 
those not sharing the political and cultural legacy of Latin Christendom. Collective memories 
celebrating the superiority of the conquerors left bitterness and resistance - interdependent histories 
of dispossession and injustice (Shoard, 1987).  That dispossession is arguably no less a feature of 
European integration today.       
 
3. THE EUROPEAN DEMOS 
With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the people of Europe became citizens of the Union. This prompted 
a vigorous debate as to whether there is a European demos – a people with sufficient shared 
sentiments and history, to give legitimacy to the formation of a political community, which can act in 
their name and be democratically accountable to them.  Particularly active in this debate have been 
German political scientists such as Habermas (2001) and Scharpf (2014). Only when there is a 
European demos, having a sense of shared identity, will there be the basis for distributive justice 
towards those who lose out, from the turbulence of economic and social change that European 
integration entails.  
The debate contrasts the European Union and the nation. The latter has a well-defined demos, the 
former has not reached that stage.  Nevertheless, this oversimplifies the contrast.   As we have seen, 
the individual member states and their political institutions were not always established on the back 
of a national demos.  On the contrary, it can be state formation itself that brings about a self-conscious 
demos, forged out of disparate communities and cultures.  This may remain a work in progress, or a 
work arrested and incomplete. The formation of a demos may then leave those constituent 
communities advancing competing projects for their shared national destiny.   
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The national demos is therefore typically, to repeat, a contested and power-laden construct, as is its 
relationship to democracy and citizenship.  This is true even of the UK, a long-established nation state 
that has remained immune to foreign invasion for almost a millennium.  That period has seen a variety 
of rebellions and fissiparous movements, not least in recent decades. There have also been recurrent 
challenges to the aristocratic dominance entrenched by the Norman invasion and its legacy of elite 
social privilege.  Thus for 20th Century writers such as Tawney (1931, 1964) and Raymond Williams 
(1961), it was by mobilising the English people, in egalitarian opposition to unbridled privilege, that 
they could be bound together, in solidarity and common purpose, and their political institutions made 
effective.   
Nations and their political institutions spring however not just from the designs of the peoples who 
inhabit a particular territory, but also from those of their neighbours and the great powers. Within 
each of those nations, this interdependent history may then divide the peoples in question, as much 
as it unites them. The legacy of conflict and contestation can make some borders problematic, from 
Ireland to the Balkans.  It may engender a politics of reconciliation and amnesty - or one of retribution 
and revenge (Deák et al., 2000).              
The forms of economic and political governance adopted now by the EU have the power to heal or to 
re-open those historical wounds. Some fault-lines of historical conflict, both between and within 
individual nations, may have more chance of healing in the context of a European demos, than within 
that of the nation state.   Ireland is a good example, given additional topical significance by the debates 
around Brexit. Nevertheless, some forms of EU governance also have the power to re-open submerged 
and half-forgotten historical antagonisms, notably those arising from the legacy of WW2: as illustrated 
by recurrent tensions in recent years between Germany and Greece and Poland.   
It was never however just a matter of a national versus a European demos.  For the British there was 
always the rival attraction of the Anglosphere – never more than today, as Trump’s America appears 
as the main prize for post-Brexit trade deals (Pearce and Kenny, 2018). For the French, plans for 
European integration were closely associated with their continuing interest in Africa and various 
projects of neo-colonialism (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014).  It was also however part of their effort to 
resist the Anglosphere and ensure French pre-eminence in post WW2 Europe. This was the 
Francosphere as demos.    
Meanwhile, if a European demos is indeed forming, it is taking many forms, not all of which embody 
the noble sentiments of solidarity and civility which German scholars espouse.  Eurosceptic parties 
draw on each other’s experiences and political toolkits to strengthen their critique of the European 
project. They build alliances of European peoples determined to set the EU institutions on fire. 1  The 
EU institutions, hardly fit for purpose, provide the grit around which this transnational sentiment can 
opportunistically organise itself.      
 
4. INSECURITY AND EUROSCEPTICISM 
Since the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing programmes of austerity, many local communities 
across Europe have faced growing insecurity.  This has produced a sense of dismay and vulnerability, 
with a readiness to blame immigration and European integration.  
In June 2016 the UK voted to leave the EU, in the most vivid and dramatic expression of this 
Euroscepticism. The aim was ‘take back control’ of its money, its trade deals and above all its borders. 
Immigration into the UK over the decade until 2016 had been 5.77 million.2  Many immigrants went 
into areas of low-cost accommodation, alongside the working class households from whom many 
Leave voters came. During the same period, austerity and recession meant cuts in public services, in 
jobs and in benefits, which hit those same communities particularly hard. Was it surprising that 
established residents should infer a causal connection? And was it surprising that they felt insecure 
and abandoned? 3   
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One response has been rooted in the national memories of ‘Britain alone’ in 1940: an island people 
self-reliant and self-contained, and with a strong sense of its external boundaries.   This figures large 
in the language and imagery of the Brexiteers and their hostility to immigration.  A second response 
to community insecurity is also however possible – also rooted in the 1940s, that crucial moment of 
Britain’s national re-definition.  Even while WW2 was still under way, government set out a new social 
contract, with a vigorous social policy strongly related to national identity and solidarity (Marshall, 
1950, Titmuss, 1963). This set the fraternity and mutual interdependence of citizenship against the 
divisions and inequalities of class and the turbulence and insecurity of an urban-industrial society.   
In the years that followed the Second World War, the social contract between State and citizen, across 
the western world, involved a pooling of risks and uncertainties through systems of social security. 
The same period saw governments confronting the economic instability of capitalist society. This has 
sometimes been characterised as a consensual process, the benign fruit of economic progress 
(Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1958). Nevertheless, as T H Marshall (1950) warned: ‘in the twentieth century, 
citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war’. It was only out of that struggle that 
institutions of shared security emerged.  
By the 1980s and 1990s however, and not only in the UK, those institutions were becoming somewhat 
threadbare. The economic crisis following 2008 - and the programme of austerity that followed – 
provided the coup de grâce. Solidarity failed; all but the wealthiest suffered; working class 
communities suffered most of all. They sensed their vulnerability in particular to the loss of jobs - 
whether these were taken by newcomers from inside or outside the EU, or by the stronger economies 
of the EU core, out-competing local employers and creating economic wastelands.  
Across Europe, the 2008 crisis undermined the legitimacy of major social and political institutions. The 
general direction of social policies has been to push many into the market place, narrowing public 
generosity towards those in need. The burden of austerity has thus fallen on the most disadvantaged, 
multiplying the uncertainties to which they are exposed.   
 
5. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE  
This paper started with three commonplace judgements on the European Union – its success in healing 
the wounds of war, its failure to win democratic engagement and its vulnerability now to the seeds of 
disintegration. It has argued that each of these judgements is overly simplistic and for reasons that 
are closely interconnected. These are moreover the ‘high politics’ of European integration, expressing 
the concerns of political elites.  Against these, I propose a rather different agenda, in relation to social 
and economic justice, the turmoil, dislocation and hurt that European integration produces, the critical 
questioning of political elites and the creative diversity of the Union. I deal with each of them in turn.      
European integration in the High Middle Ages involved the dispossession of the peasantry from the 
common land and their subjection to a feudal system of agriculture. This was a project driven by social 
and economic elites.  EU policy makers have been perennially concerned that their electorates tend 
to see modern European integration in similar terms.  Hence their wish to provide the EU with a ‘social 
dimension’.  This involved ensuring common social standards (as much to avoid unfair competition 
between businesses as to benefit citizens) and exchanging best practices in policies for education, 
training and social welfare.  It developed particularly during the Delors presidency, with the move to 
the Single Market; and with growing concerns at the turn of the century over the weakness of the 
European economy, as new digital industries began to dominate.4 This was never however so 
ambitious as to intrude on the prerogatives of the member states in social policy, a major area of 
spending and political saliency with the domestic electorate. 
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The financial crisis of 2008 changed everything.  Now it was the banking system and the public finances 
that needed protection - by providing a safety net for those banks that held bad risks and by austerity 
policies that shifted the burden of that safety net onto the population as a whole. The result was 
particularly severe for the weaker economies of the Eurozone, required to follow the currency’s 
budgetary disciplines, but without any mechanism for solidarity between them, only a debtors’ prison 
for the worst offenders.   
The consequence was rising unemployment and impoverishment across much of the periphery.   
Imprisoned within the straitjacket of German ordo-liberalism and austerity, the EU proved unable to 
develop a European solution for an interconnected European economy.  The longstanding reluctance 
of national governments to have the EU institutions involved in their national social policies, coupled 
with the prominent role played by the EU institutions in the enforcement of austerity, meant that 
those institutions had little to offer the mass of the European population, in terms of social and 
economic justice in hard economic times.   
With the economic desertification of southern Europe, and conflict across the MENA area, pushing 
many towards the European north-west, it is not surprising that the populations of the north-west 
have turned against such incomers. This is especially the case with local communities which are 
suffering from austerity and lack of investment and which fear intensified competition for local jobs.  
These are the ‘hot politics’ with which European citizens are fundamentally concerned and by 
reference to which they judge their politicians.  It is however easy for local and national politicians to 
blame the more distant institutions of the EU. This has been a potent brew for the politics of European 
disintegration.     
Social and economic security for communities across the Continent has become a central political 
challenge for the EU.  If Europe-wide economic and social changes of the 21st Century are to be 
managed successfully and with public consent, they will need a new social contract to underpin them. 
5  This will in turn require reforms to the institutional order of the EU and more active democratic 
engagement with markets and corporate interests.   
Going well beyond traditional welfare systems, this re-orientation of European policy might have three 
main elements.    
Rejuvenate the European Economy 
It will be necessary, first, to confront the toxic austerity regime.  Austerity insists that reduction of the 
public sector deficit must be the principal economic goal, pursued mainly through cuts in public 
expenditure (Blaug). There is however an alternative and very different analysis.  Stiglitz (2016) wants 
a stimulus to promote growth, especially in the stagnating regions.  Incomes in surplus countries might 
be allowed to rise, in the hope that some would be spent by consumers and businesses there on goods 
and services from the weaker economies.     
A better response however would involve a positive industrial strategy aimed to spreading jobs and 
useful work to all localities and regions, revitalising local communities.   This could include investment 
in infrastructure, human capital and the science base, especially through long-term projects of a scale 
and duration the private sector cannot contemplate on its own. Concerted action by governments 
could also build new markets, including for green technologies and energy sources. This is consistent 
with calls for a European ‘Green New Deal’ that have recently become more widespread.    
Such rejuvenating of the European economy will surely require significant fiscal integration. Various 
proposals for fiscal union in the eurozone have been advanced in recent years, including by Piketty, 
starting with corporation tax. They also then argue for the creation of new democratic institutions for 
the eurozone, lest fiscal union will be experienced as a further loss of sovereignty and accountability.    
Security and Creativity for All 
Individual security against the risks of income interruption was the heartland of traditional welfare 
states.  Over the last half-century, however, those solidarities have been on the defensive across much 
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of the industrialised world, in the face of neoliberal hostility to state welfare. The globalisation of 
markets and the shift to new knowledge-based technologies has brought insecurity to large swathes 
of the population; and it was this insecurity, in part at least, that created the social conditions for 
Brexit.  In turbulent times, the solidarities of strong welfare systems must therefore be retained, not 
dismantled, in the face of neoliberal markets (Polanyi, 1944, Rieger and Leibfried, 2003).   
Meanwhile however, the financial crisis showed who calls the shots, within western political 
economies. Governments came forward as guarantors of the banks’ viability. The costs were spread 
across society, in particular by retrenchment in public provision and in the institutions of collective 
solidarity on which most people depend. Security for citizens and communities was thus, at least in 
some degree, in tension with security for the financial institutions. The tension is all the greater, when 
taxation systems become less progressive; when taxation of footloose corporations is driven by a ‘race 
to the bottom’ against national tax authorities; and when governments shift from taxation as a source 
of revenue to borrowing on the bond markets. This is what Streek (2014) describes as the ‘Debt State’; 
Galbraith (2009) as the ‘Predator State’. Tax reform is also therefore a necessary part of any European 
reform, in any attempt to ‘rescue Europe’.  
The shift to a knowledge economy depends not only on collective security and solidarity, but also on 
human investment and skills. This is especially important for the demographically challenged societies 
of Europe, which can ill afford to waste the creativity of their scarce human resources, and must equip 
them to respond successfully to the new challenges of artificial intelligence and robotics. This will need 
more investment in the least skilled in particular, since this can yield the greatest returns in terms of 
economic growth (Coulombe et al., 2004).  However, if our education and training systems are to 
prioritise these groups, they need to be much more inclusive than at present.  Otherwise they will be 
neither socially equitable nor economically efficient.   
Re-Think Free Movement 
Free movement also needs re-thinking: the free movement of people, but also of goods, services and 
capital.  Being forced to migrate north because of the economic desertification of one’s home region 
is no freedom.  It is also no ‘free movement’ if rich countries denude poorer countries of their highly 
skilled people, because they have themselves failed to invest sufficiently in training. 
Free movement of goods and services may allow economies of scale and reductions in the price of 
consumer goods – but it can also mean downward pressure on social and environmental standards 
and the destruction of employment in communities unable to compete. The free movement of capital 
may mean downward pressure on taxable capacity, as businesses threaten to move elsewhere, and 
disregard any obligations towards the communities where they are based.  
Free movement requires some collective responsibility for the infrastructures of the communities to 
which large numbers of immigrants come, rather than ‘devolving’ this burden to the local areas in 
question. This is true, whether those incomers arrive from outside or inside the country in question, 
and whether they are coming for work, tourism or education.   We allow fragile environments to be 
protected and watched over by local communities. We encourage their community stewardship 
(Ostrom, 1990). It would be strange not to extend that thinking to their jealous protection of their 
social fabric.  
This is part of the larger question of how national and European policies can support local 
communities, especially those facing major social and economic change. Leaving them at the mercy 
of global markets risks community disintegration – as much through the exit of secure jobs, as through 
the arrival of incomers.  This will require investment in the social and economic security of all our 
communities. It could mean re-embedding capital within local and regional communities, including for 
example encouraging community co-ownership of local businesses. This is central to the reforms of 
the UK economy proposed by Hutton (2015: Ch 5), with business ownership a vehicle for innovation 
and community benefit as much as for profit.    
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In short, therefore, the free movement of labour, capital, goods and services requires some more 
careful assessment of who benefits.  Blind commitment to the ‘four freedoms’ is not a sound basis for 
public policy (Supiot, 2012: Ch 5).  It is as unhelpful to insist on the ‘free movement of people’ as an 
absolute principle of the EU, as it is to insist on ‘control of its borders’ as an absolute necessity for 
each nation state. A more intelligent conversation is needed, seeking to balance the diverse interests 
involved, and resisting extremist groups who fan the flames with their divisive rhetoric.  
To address these challenges and tensions will require reforms to the European project going much 
further than those foreseen by the European Commission, in its White Paper on the Future of Europe 
(European Commission, 2017) or Macron’s proposals for fiscal federalism and banking reform.   The 
European Pillar of Social Rights, launched with much fanfare at the end of 2017, re-affirms social 
alongside economic priorities, neatly packaged into twenty (non-binding) principles into three 
categories. Whether however it develops into a stronger European Social Union is at best an open 
question, and depends crucially on what diagnosis of the current malaise political leaders adopt 
(Ferrera, 2018, Garben, 2019).    
          
6. TURMOIL, DISLOCATION AND HURT 
War and conflict drove the making of Europe in the High Middle Ages, as it did, mutatis mutandis, in 
our own time. In that earlier period, it left a legacy of resistance, albeit scattered and in general 
ineffective - and indeed, largely forgotten, with the history being written principally by the victors.           
In modern times, it was the determination to avoid further war and conflict that inspired European 
integration.   Reconciliation trumped revenge - the lessons of Versailles had been learned.  In addition, 
within western Europe new lines of potential conflict with the Soviet Union reinforced the urgency of 
reconciliation with Germany.    
Nevertheless, the moral ledger of brutal conflict and oppression cannot easily be wiped clean; it leaves 
unresolved hurt.  Germany acknowledged its guilt in relation to the Jews, but perhaps not sufficiently 
in regards to the populations of the countries it invaded and devastated.6 Yet during WW2, the 
populations of the occupied countries were also gravely compromised.  Most of Europe collaborated 
– and even took advantage of German occupation to settle ethnic and territorial scores.  In Hungary 
for example, the treaties imposed at the end of WW1 had produced tensions and hopes for revenge 
that structured domestic politics throughout the inter-war years – and the readiness to enter into 
alliance with Germany during WW2 (Deák et al., 2000: 39-73, 295, 307).  Each nation is fractured – 
none is a homogeneous and cohesive entity with a shared purpose.    
Wartime memories and myths were then significant in the construction of post-war states - further 
complicated by the new east-west divide (Deák et al., 2000).   Those memories still fester – as witness 
the furore in Poland, during 2017-18, over the extent of Polish involvement in the German treatment 
of Polish Jews during the wartime years.7 The UK avoided German occupation and the moral 
compromises this might have entailed; but its own history, in relation to Ireland, is replete with such 
bitter memories of an intertwined history, that this still threatens a precarious peace.  This has also 
proved the most difficult element of the UK’s withdrawal agreement with the EU.    
The intertwined hurts of war can only heal as those involved listen to each other, recognise the hurt,    
acknowledge their responsibility and where possible make restitution. The same goes for the 
economic turmoil and desertification of today: the result, not of impersonal markets, but of national 
and European policies, whose effects reverberate across the Continent, destroying the livelihoods of 
local communities and citizens far removed from the centres of power.  Germany has been central to 
the economic transformations that have re-shaped the EU, but also to the austerity policies which the 
EU institutions have imposed. This has been unfortunate, to say the least, in re-opening some of the 
scars and memories of war (most obviously in regards to the treatment of Greece – see Varoufakis, 
2017).    
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How the EU deals with such ‘hot’ politics could reopen those ancient wounds, so that they become 
deep fractures.  It could, alternatively, establish a system of social and economic justice, in which the 
distant consequences for local communities across the Continent, of policy decisions taken by 
powerful European political and business elites, are not left unnoticed and neglected, a matter to be 
dealt with by local actors, with their limited scope for action.  That could indeed set the seal on post-
war reconciliation, establishing European social and economic peace for the 21 Century.      
 
7. CRITICAL SCRUTINY AND CREATIVE DIVERSITY  
Such an agenda of social and economic justice would surely however founder. Solidarity among 
European citizens is too weak to support distributive justice towards those who lose out from 
European integration, as argued in the German debates on the European demos. 
Middelaar (2014) asks how far European citizens already have a shared sense of European identity. 
Not much, to judge by their cultural politics and symbols.  The European public seems to recognise 
itself culturally only through the competitive circus of the Eurovision song contest and the European 
football championship - playing out memories and historic grievances that divide, vilify and blame.   
He asks secondly what benefits the EU offers its citizens, as an anchor for their affections.  Freedom 
of movement is one benefit, but it can also increase competition for jobs in the host countries.  These 
effects and costs were always ‘vastly underestimated’ (p 261).   
Middelaar turns finally to the involvement of the European public in political change, as they 
interrogate their politicians.  The European Parliament has had little success in mediating between the 
people and those who govern; and the very fact that European politics has been extremely consensus-
oriented detracts from real debate. We walk on eggshells: forever aware of our conflicting histories, 
ancient wounds and sensitivities easily re-awakened.  The halting development of a European demos 
is hardly surprising.    
One response has been that while Europe is too large an expanse for direct democratic participation, 
interaction among national democracies is both feasible and desirable. This demoi-cracy would give 
expression to democratic interdependence among the peoples of Europe, with ‘horizontal transfers 
of authority, cooperation, impact and representation’ (Nicolaidis, 2013).  It could be a creative process 
out of which a European demos might eventually emerge (Innerarity, 2014).  But through what cross-
national practices and transfers would such a European demoi-cracy be constituted (Scharpf, 2014)?   
One approach is via the principle of subsidiarity. This became well-established in the Euro-lexicon 
through the Maastricht Treaty. Initially, it was understood as devolution of decision-making 
downwards.  As far as possible, matters should be managed at the national or sub-national level, 
unless there are cross-border externalities.  This is why social policy has remained very much a 
responsibility of national governments.          
The Lisbon process of March 2000 was concerned with the development of a dynamic but socially 
cohesive knowledge-based economy.  National responsibility was retained for most of the relevant 
policies, but systematic comparison of national performance by reference to common benchmarks 
would assist the transfer of best practice. This was subsidiarity understood as horizontal cross-national 
policy learning and convergence, even if within much of the Lisbon process, such cross-national 
learning has remained limited and rather bureaucratic (Atkinson et al., 2005, Ch 6).  
It was however never clear whether the Lisbon process was intended to track the progress of member 
states towards a single common future, defined by reference to common economic and technological 
imperatives. Or were benchmarks of national performance instead meant to display different 
scenarios of potential development, with real political choices and trade-offs (Room, 2011: Ch 16)?  If 
so, how far should these debates involve wider public scrutiny, with domestic political leaders forced 
to justify their performance by comparison with good practice in other countries? Social 
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benchmarking of this sort could have major consequences for their political credibility.  This would be 
subsidiarity understood as creative and critical scrutiny upwards.  
This is consistent with some of the pressures for change around the 2020 European Strategy, the 
updated Lisbon process, which called for more opportunities for citizens and communities to 
participate in European governance, along with trade unions and other civil society organisations 
(Natali and Vanhercke, 2015: 248, 258). This would constitute a powerful commitment to good 
governance on the part of the EU, for while it would affirm national responsibility, it would also affirm 
Community interest in how that national responsibility is exercised (see also De la Porte et al., 2001: 
300-301). This sort of creative subsidiarity could thus provide one way of addressing the ‘democratic 
deficit’ discussed earlier - connecting-up communities and associating them in a transnational demos.    
In some small and modest ways, there are already prototypes of this within the history of the EU. One 
was the succession of ‘pilot programmes’ to combat poverty launched by the Commission between 
the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s (Room, 2014). Poverty was of course outside the scope of 
Community social policy as defined by the Treaty of Rome (Collins, 1975). These programmes were 
therefore small and required special decisions by the Council of Ministers – but their novelty and their 
concern with the living conditions not just of workers, but of citizens in general, gave them a certain 
freedom to develop outside the normal constraints of Commission functioning. So did their small 
scale, which obliged the Commission to limit them to a range of local communities and to work in 
concert with NGOs.  
The result was a succession of initiatives involving local communities from across Europe, connected 
through the evaluation experts on whom the Council had insisted.  Once connected, they used that 
intelligence network for their own purposes. Local projects were able to bring their peers together on 
their own turf, to enrich the debates with city decision-makers in which the local project was involved; 
they also brought Commission officials and national civil servants to events at which those decision-
makers would have to defend their policy choices, in the glare of international publicity (Room, 1986: 
Ch 4). This was a foretaste of the ‘creative subsidiarity’ that local communities can exercise, exposing 
local, national and European decision-makers to public scrutiny – and associating those communities 
in a transnational demos, critical of the prevailing order.   
Small prototypes of this sort will not change the world, but they may provide models on which other 
social and political actors can draw – including national parliaments.  Hereby a transnational European 
demos – a demoi-cracy indeed - is in some measure constituted from below. This involves not just 
securing mutual respect for what Scharpf (2014: 1,16) terms ‘legitimate diversity’, but also building 
new forms of that diversity, through transnational association and practice. This would balance an 
‘ever-closer union’, as the goal of European development, with an ever more diverse and creative 
union, enjoying strong social solidarity and participatory democracy (Leonard, 1999: Ch 5).  
Meanwhile, however, national governments invoke mandates established by the European 
authorities, under the rules of fiscal consolidation, against domestic opponents of austerity (Streek, 
2014: Ch 3).  New forms of domination are also being developed by corporate and financial interests, 
using the transnational spaces that European integration offers (Varoufakis, 2017: Ch 7). Thus, against 
the apolitical market optimism of recent decades, what European austerity has exposed are the social 
class divisions of capitalism. This is why any reform process is much more than an exercise in economic 
management and social cohesion; it is fundamentally political, a struggle for social and economic 
justice.    
 
8. CONCLUSION - REMAKING OURSELVES TOGETHER  
Much of the discussion on European integration has tended to assume a single direction of travel.  The 
debate has been about the scope for a ‘multi-speed’ Europe, as against progressing at the pace of the 
slowest vessel. The European Commission’s White Paper of March 2017 continued this theme.  Now 
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however there is growing acknowledgement of the multiple possible futures for Europe – and the 
political choices in which the people of the Union need somehow to be involved, if they are not to join 
the growing army of Eurosceptic recruits.    
The ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU is in part a constitutional question, concerned with the institutions 
through which citizens can have an effective political voice. It is also however a question of how the 
uneven distribution of the benefits of economic integration – and the insecurity and inequality it tends 
to produce – can be made consistent with the demands of social cohesion and political stability.    
What the European institutions lack is not so much ingenuity in constitutional reform, as the capacity 
and the will to address the insecurity and inequality that this uneven economic integration has been 
generating. This will require much more than a single market and a single currency; adding further 
layers of political union will also not suffice. What is needed is a Europe-wide social contract, 
committed to social and economic justice for communities across the Continent, as outlined earlier.   
No less important is for those communities to have opportunities for active and critical citizenship – 
‘creative subsidiarity’ of the sort just described - putting them confidently in charge of their own 
destinies. This is a necessary bulwark against social and political dissolution - and a precondition for 
establishing a European demos.     
This means that ‘creative subsidiarity’ is not the final destination of this paper.  The question is rather 
how we can re-make ourselves out of the pool of shared European experience. However, maybe we 
can do this only by first confronting our own ugly face in the interdependent history we have wrestled 
over – facing up to what we have done to our nearest, if not our dearest.  This will involve, alongside 
the celebration of what we are as nations, a reflective musing on the injuries we have inflicted on 
others.   
This is not therefore just about ensuring that the EU institutions are scrutinised and held to account, 
but rather that we as European nations are held to account by our neighbours – and are ready to 
present ourselves for their scrutiny.  We draw on our shared experience, not just by borrowing from 
them ‘what works’ but also by heeding ‘what hurts’. This is evidence-based policy-making as 
restitutive justice. It means allocating and accepting responsibility, for hurts past and present, and for 
the way in which power has been exercised.          
That is after all what we expect, within a national demos.  The accountability of government is only a 
means to that end: ensuring social and economic justice from our national community.  We expect to 
hold people and organisations to account – and to enforce their responsibilities as neighbours.  At a 
European level in contrast, the ECJ is concerned only with whether the EU institutions and the member 
states have behaved as they should under the Treaties.  The Commission has some role in regulating 
corporations and governments and it has the power to levy fines for breaches of European regulations.  
Neither ensures restitution for hurt caused.  The Strasbourg Court of Human Rights likewise does no 
more than make judgments; it cannot punish or require restitution; that falls to national courts and 
governments. The social costs imposed by actors from one country on the communities and citizens 
of others are largely disregarded.     
This means recognising the complex and indirect chains of causation by which the costs and 
insecurities generated by wealth creation are visited on many less able to bear them (Hayward, 2006, 
Room, 2015). It requires a readiness and capability to heed the distant consequences of our actions 
and the distant drivers of our own pain, instead of attributing these ills to the individual failings of 
those on whom they fall, the disconnected and the disempowered.  This is what a new European 
demos will surely involve - with European people holding political and economic power to account 
without regard to national boundaries.   Thus as Nicolaidis argues: ‘Germans and Greeks should not 
only have the right to put the problems they create for each other’s democratic health on each other’s 
political agenda, but should entrench institutional mechanisms to address them. … From this, an 
enlarged mentality may even emerge, as Kant would have it, of thinking from the point of view of 
everyone else’ (2013, pp 6, 9).    
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This is however far from the current reform agenda of the European Union. Austerity remains 
entrenched and there is a sad lack of strategic vision.  Not least, it hides the ascendancy of the 
corporate behemoths that today bestride the European Union.  It is not only in relation to nationalistic 
governments and ossified EU institutions that the reforms discussed here would need to be 
developed, but in relation to the corporate world: taking back control from corporate Europe and 
holding them to account. The European Union was established in the afterglow of liberation from 
German occupation; it is now the corporate occupation of our political and social institutions that 
must be addressed, if Europe is to enjoy social and economic peace for the 21st Century and not 
dissolve into competing fragments.   
The making of Europe in the High Middle Ages saw the aristocracies of Charlemagne’s erstwhile 
domain spreading across Europe.  They appropriated the common lands, imposed feudal dues and 
forced the peasantry to conform to the new order.  Bartlett sees continuities between this and the 
European expropriation of colonial territories in the Americas, Asia and Africa during more recent 
centuries. 8 Recent decades have likewise seen public spaces and assets appropriated for private 
benefit, monetisation and corporate expansion: not least, those public services and forms of collective 
solidarity established in mid-20th century to protect against the insecurities of the market place.  This 
is what Galbraith (2009) describes as the ‘Predator State’.    
Even amidst the aristocratic ascendancy that Bartlett describes, new seeds of disruptive change were 
however emerging.  Newly established towns constituted themselves as new forms of community, 
resisting the power of the feudal ruler and weaving their own networks of trade and communication.  
Such hinterlands of resistance were again to play a key part, in limiting the expansion of European 
empires across Africa and Asia in the ensuing centuries (Darwin, 2007).  Alongside the celebratory 
history of the conqueror, there was insurrection and challenge.  Today also, there may yet be scope 
to remake Europe.    
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who were further marginalised, by the lack of opportunities in the places where they lived, faced a ‘double 
whammy’; here the voting divide was even greater.  
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requires would not come at too high a human cost. These were collective risks to be managed on a Europe-wide 
basis (Rodrigues, 2002).  
5 This was after all a central element in the consolidation of nation states in the modern era – think of the role 
of social insurance in Bismarck’s project for German unification in the late 19th Century, and the social contract 
of social and economic security for all, embodied in British welfare legislation of the 1940s.    
6 Willy Brandt was particularly associated with such acknowledgement, notably at the monument to victims of 
the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1970.   
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8 This raises much larger questions about the drivers of European colonialism and the epistemic, moral and 
political challenges of empire (Darwin, 2007, Blom Hansen, 2019).    
 
